From bb0ea229e41d3554f8dd1d61d995835f67e2b76f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nik L
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2026 15:35:34 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] feat: better framing tied to prompt injection
---
app/api/analyze/prompt.txt | 2 ++
app/greyscan/page.tsx | 13 +++++++++++--
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/app/api/analyze/prompt.txt b/app/api/analyze/prompt.txt
index cfabfaf..5d999f7 100644
--- a/app/api/analyze/prompt.txt
+++ b/app/api/analyze/prompt.txt
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ These files are a prompt injection surface. A malicious contributor, compromised
- Override safety behaviors the agent would normally follow
- Instruct the agent to ignore security warnings
+IMPORTANT: A sandbox like Greywall does NOT prevent prompt injection. The agent will still read these files and follow the instructions. What a sandbox does is contain the blast radius: even if the agent is hijacked, it can't exfiltrate data (network blocked), can't read secrets (filesystem denied), can't run destructive commands (command blocked). Prompt injection findings should reflect this nuance: the risk is that the agent's behavior is manipulated, and without a sandbox the manipulated agent has unrestricted access.
+
If agent instruction files exist in this repo, this is a SIGNIFICANT finding. The more instruction files present, the larger the attack surface.
SEVERITY CONTEXT:
diff --git a/app/greyscan/page.tsx b/app/greyscan/page.tsx
index 2d4c492..e2c34d7 100644
--- a/app/greyscan/page.tsx
+++ b/app/greyscan/page.tsx
@@ -584,6 +584,11 @@ export default function GamePage() {
{finding.severity}
+ {finding.type === 'prompt_injection' && (
+
+ · sandbox limits damage
+
+ )}
{finding.title}
@@ -606,10 +611,14 @@ export default function GamePage() {
This is not a security certification. It's a demonstration of what's possible without a sandbox.
- Greywall blocks this by default.
+ {report.findings.some(f => f.type === 'prompt_injection')
+ ? 'Greywall limits what a hijacked agent can actually do.'
+ : 'Greywall blocks this by default.'}
- Container-free sandboxing with real-time observability for AI agents.
+ {report.findings.some(f => f.type === 'prompt_injection')
+ ? 'A sandbox can\'t prevent prompt injection, but it ensures a hijacked agent can\'t read secrets, call APIs, or exfiltrate data.'
+ : 'Container-free sandboxing with real-time observability for AI agents.'}