fix: filter directory-only Landlock rights for non-directory paths (#17)

internal/sandbox/integration_linux_test.go

@@ -246,19 +246,6 @@ func TestLinux_NetworkBlocksCurl(t *testing.T) {
 	assertNetworkBlocked(t, result)
 }
 
-// TestLinux_NetworkBlocksWget verifies that wget cannot reach the network.
-func TestLinux_NetworkBlocksWget(t *testing.T) {
-	skipIfAlreadySandboxed(t)
-	skipIfCommandNotFound(t, "wget")
-
-	workspace := createTempWorkspace(t)
-	cfg := testConfigWithWorkspace(workspace)
-
-	result := runUnderSandboxWithTimeout(t, cfg, "wget -q --timeout=2 -O /dev/null http://example.com", workspace, 10*time.Second)
-
-	assertBlocked(t, result)
-}
-
 // TestLinux_NetworkBlocksPing verifies that ping cannot reach the network.
 func TestLinux_NetworkBlocksPing(t *testing.T) {
 	skipIfAlreadySandboxed(t)
@@ -482,6 +469,41 @@ func TestLinux_ProcSelfEnvReadable(t *testing.T) {
 	assertAllowed(t, result)
 }
 
+// TestLinux_GlobPatternAllowsWriteToMatchingFile verifies that glob patterns
+// like "~/.claude*" correctly allow writes to matching files (not just directories).
+// The bug was that Landlock rules for files were silently failing because
+// directory-only access rights (MAKE_*, REFER, etc.) were being applied.
+func TestLinux_GlobPatternAllowsWriteToMatchingFile(t *testing.T) {
+	skipIfAlreadySandboxed(t)
+
+	workspace := createTempWorkspace(t)
+
+	testFile := filepath.Join(workspace, ".testglob.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(testFile, []byte(`{"initial": true}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create test file: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Configure allowWrite with a glob pattern that matches the file
+	cfg := testConfigWithWorkspace(workspace)
+	cfg.Filesystem.AllowWrite = []string{
+		workspace,
+		filepath.Join(workspace, ".testglob*"),
+	}
+
+	// Try to append to the file (shouldn't fail)
+	result := runUnderSandbox(t, cfg, "echo 'appended' >> "+testFile, workspace)
+
+	assertAllowed(t, result)
+
+	content, err := os.ReadFile(testFile) //nolint:gosec
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to read file: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(content), "appended") {
+		t.Errorf("expected file to contain 'appended', got: %s", string(content))
+	}
+}
+
 // ============================================================================
 // Helper functions
 // ============================================================================

internal/sandbox/linux_landlock.go

@@ -323,9 +323,48 @@ func (l *LandlockRuleset) addPathRule(path string, access uint64) error {
 	}
 	defer func() { _ = unix.Close(fd) }()
 
+	// Use fstat on the fd to avoid TOCTOU race between stat and open
+	var stat unix.Stat_t
+	if err := unix.Fstat(fd, &stat); err != nil {
+		if l.debug {
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "[fence:landlock] Failed to fstat path %s: %v\n", absPath, err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	isDir := (stat.Mode & unix.S_IFMT) == unix.S_IFDIR
+
 	// Intersect with handled access to avoid invalid combinations
 	access &= l.getHandledAccessFS()
 
+	// Filter out directory-only access rights for non-directory paths (files, sockets, devices, etc.).
+	// Landlock returns EINVAL if you try to add MAKE_*, REMOVE_*, READ_DIR, or REFER rights to a non-directory.
+	// See: https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html
+	// File-compatible rights: EXECUTE, WRITE_FILE, READ_FILE, TRUNCATE
+	// Directory-only rights: READ_DIR, REMOVE_*, MAKE_*, REFER
+	if !isDir {
+		dirOnlyRights := uint64(
+			LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+		)
+		access &^= dirOnlyRights
+	}
+
+	if access == 0 {
+		if l.debug {
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "[fence:landlock] Skipping %s: no applicable access rights\n", absPath)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	attr := landlockPathBeneathAttr{
 		allowedAccess: access,
 		parentFd:      int32(fd), //nolint:gosec // fd from unix.Open fits in int32