Refactor and improve documentation, add examples

This commit is contained in:
JY Tan
2025-12-23 18:43:07 -08:00
parent b98b640f5a
commit 8db245f56e
32 changed files with 1348 additions and 162 deletions

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examples/.gitignore vendored Normal file
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# Dependencies
node_modules/
venv/
__pycache__/
# Build outputs
build-output/
dist/
generated/
# Lock files (we want fresh installs for demos)
package-lock.json
yarn.lock
pnpm-lock.yaml
# Python
*.pyc
*.egg-info/
# Temp files
*.log
*.tmp

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# Dev Server + Redis Demo
This demo shows how fence controls network access: allowing specific external domains while blocking (or allowing) localhost connections.
## Prerequisites
You need Redis running on localhost:6379:
```bash
docker run -p 6379:6379 redis:alpine
```
## Install
```bash
npm install
```
## Demo 1: Localhost allowed, external blocked
This shows that requests to Redis (local service) works, but external requests are blocked.
```bash
fence -p 3000 --settings fence-external-blocked.json npm start
```
Test it:
```bash
# Works - localhost outbound to Redis allowed
curl http://localhost:3000/api/users
# Blocked - no domains whitelisted for external requests
curl http://localhost:3000/api/external
```
## Demo 2: External Allowed, Localhost Blocked
This shows the opposite: whitelisted external domains work, but Redis (localhost) is blocked.
```bash
fence -p 3000 --settings fence-external-only.json npm start
```
You will immediately notice that Redis connection is blocked on app startup:
```text
[app] Redis connection failed: connect EPERM 127.0.0.1:6379 - Local (0.0.0.0:0)
```
Test it:
```bash
# Works - httpbin.org is in the allowlist
curl http://localhost:3000/api/external
# Blocked - localhost outbound to Redis not allowed
curl http://localhost:3000/api/users
```
## Summary
| Config | Redis (localhost) | External (httpbin.org) |
|--------|-------------------|------------------------|
| `fence-external-blocked.json` | ✓ Allowed | ✗ Blocked |
| `fence-external-only.json` | ✗ Blocked | ✓ Allowed |
## Key Settings
| Setting | Purpose |
|---------|---------|
| `allowLocalBinding` | Server can listen on ports |
| `allowLocalOutbound` | App can connect to localhost services |
| `allowedDomains` | Whitelist of external domains |
## Note: Node.js Proxy Support
Node.js's native `http`/`https` modules don't respect proxy environment variables. This demo uses [`undici`](https://github.com/nodejs/undici) with `ProxyAgent` to route requests through fence's proxy:
```javascript
import { ProxyAgent, fetch } from "undici";
const proxyUrl = process.env.HTTPS_PROXY;
const response = await fetch(url, {
dispatcher: new ProxyAgent(proxyUrl),
});
```
Without this, external HTTP requests would fail with connection errors (the sandbox blocks them) rather than going through fence's proxy.

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/**
* Demo Express app that:
* 1. Serves an API on port 3000
* 2. Connects to Redis on localhost:6379
* 3. Attempts to call external APIs (blocked by fence)
*
* This demonstrates allowLocalOutbound - the app can reach
* local services (Redis) but not the external internet.
*/
import express from "express";
import Redis from "ioredis";
import { ProxyAgent, fetch as undiciFetch } from "undici";
const app = express();
const PORT = 3000;
// Connect to Redis on localhost
const redis = new Redis({
host: "127.0.0.1",
port: 6379,
connectTimeout: 3000,
retryStrategy: () => null, // Don't retry, fail fast for demo
});
let redisConnected = false;
redis.on("connect", () => {
redisConnected = true;
console.log("[app] Connected to Redis");
// Seed some demo data
redis.set(
"user:1",
JSON.stringify({ id: 1, name: "Alice", email: "alice@example.com" })
);
redis.set(
"user:2",
JSON.stringify({ id: 2, name: "Bob", email: "bob@example.com" })
);
redis.set(
"user:3",
JSON.stringify({ id: 3, name: "Charlie", email: "charlie@example.com" })
);
console.log("[app] Seeded demo data");
});
redis.on("error", (err) => {
if (!redisConnected) {
console.log("[app] Redis connection failed:", err.message);
}
});
// Helper: Make external API call using undici with proxy support
// Node.js native https doesn't respect HTTP_PROXY, so we use undici
async function fetchExternal(url) {
const proxyUrl = process.env.HTTPS_PROXY || process.env.HTTP_PROXY;
const options = {
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),
};
// Use proxy if available (set by fence)
if (proxyUrl) {
options.dispatcher = new ProxyAgent(proxyUrl);
}
const response = await undiciFetch(url, options);
const text = await response.text();
return {
status: response.status,
data: text.slice(0, 200),
};
}
// Routes
app.get("/", (req, res) => {
res.json({
message: "Dev Server Demo",
redis: redisConnected ? "connected" : "disconnected",
endpoints: {
"/api/users": "List all users from Redis",
"/api/users/:id": "Get user by ID from Redis",
"/api/health": "Health check",
"/api/external": "Try to call external API (blocked by fence)",
},
});
});
app.get("/api/users", async (req, res) => {
if (!redisConnected) {
return res.status(503).json({
error: "Redis not connected",
hint: "Start Redis: docker run -p 6379:6379 redis:alpine",
});
}
try {
const keys = await redis.keys("user:*");
const users = await Promise.all(
keys.map(async (key) => JSON.parse(await redis.get(key)))
);
res.json({
source: "redis",
count: users.length,
data: users,
});
} catch (error) {
res.status(500).json({ error: error.message });
}
});
app.get("/api/users/:id", async (req, res) => {
if (!redisConnected) {
return res.status(503).json({
error: "Redis not connected",
hint: "Start Redis: docker run -p 6379:6379 redis:alpine",
});
}
try {
const user = await redis.get(`user:${req.params.id}`);
if (user) {
res.json({ source: "redis", data: JSON.parse(user) });
} else {
res.status(404).json({ error: "User not found" });
}
} catch (error) {
res.status(500).json({ error: error.message });
}
});
app.get("/api/health", async (req, res) => {
if (!redisConnected) {
return res.status(503).json({
status: "unhealthy",
redis: "disconnected",
});
}
try {
await redis.ping();
res.json({
status: "healthy",
redis: "connected",
});
} catch (error) {
res.status(503).json({
status: "unhealthy",
redis: "error",
error: error.message,
});
}
});
app.get("/api/external", async (req, res) => {
console.log("[app] Attempting external API call...");
try {
const result = await fetchExternal("https://httpbin.org/get");
// Check if we're using a proxy (indicates fence is running)
const usingProxy = !!(process.env.HTTPS_PROXY || process.env.HTTP_PROXY);
res.json({
status: "success",
message: usingProxy
? "✓ Request allowed (httpbin.org is whitelisted)"
: "⚠️ No proxy detected - not running in fence",
proxy: usingProxy ? process.env.HTTPS_PROXY : null,
data: result,
});
} catch (error) {
res.json({
status: "blocked",
message: "✓ External call blocked by fence",
error: error.message,
});
}
});
// Startup
app.listen(PORT, () => {
console.log(`
╔═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ Dev Server Demo ║
╠═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ Server: http://localhost:${PORT}
║ Redis: localhost:6379 ║
╠═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ Endpoints: ║
║ GET / - API info ║
║ GET /api/users - List users from Redis ║
║ GET /api/users/:id - Get user by ID ║
║ GET /api/health - Health check ║
║ GET /api/external - Try external call (blocked) ║
╚═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
`);
});

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{
"network": {
"allowLocalBinding": true,
"allowLocalOutbound": true
},
"filesystem": {
"allowWrite": [".", "/tmp"]
}
}

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{
"network": {
"allowLocalBinding": true,
"allowedDomains": ["httpbin.org"],
"allowLocalOutbound": false
},
"filesystem": {
"allowWrite": [".", "/tmp"]
}
}

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{
"name": "dev-server-demo",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "Demo: Dev server with Redis in fence sandbox",
"type": "module",
"main": "app.js",
"scripts": {
"start": "node app.js"
},
"dependencies": {
"express": "^4.18.2",
"ioredis": "^5.3.2",
"undici": "^6.19.2"
}
}

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# Filesystem Sandbox Demo
This demo shows how fence controls filesystem access with `allowWrite`, `denyWrite`, and `denyRead`.
## What it demonstrates
| Operation | Without Fence | With Fence |
|-----------|---------------|------------|
| Write to `./output/` | ✓ | ✓ (in allowWrite) |
| Write to `./` | ✓ | ✗ (not in allowWrite) |
| Write to `.env` | ✓ | ✗ (in denyWrite) |
| Write to `*.key` | ✓ | ✗ (in denyWrite) |
| Read `./demo.py` | ✓ | ✓ (allowed by default) |
| Read `/etc/shadow` | ✗ | ✗ (in denyRead) |
| Read `/etc/passwd` | ✓ | ✗ (in denyRead) |
## Run the demo
### Without fence (all writes succeed)
```bash
python demo.py
```
### With fence (unauthorized operations blocked)
```bash
fence --settings fence.json python demo.py
```
## Fence config
```json
{
"filesystem": {
"allowWrite": ["./output"],
"denyWrite": [".env", "*.key"],
"denyRead": ["/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd"]
}
}
```
### How it works
1. **allowWrite** - Only paths listed here are writable. Everything else is read-only.
2. **denyWrite** - These paths are blocked even if they'd otherwise be allowed. Useful for protecting secrets.
3. **denyRead** - Block reads from sensitive system files.
## Key settings
| Setting | Default | Purpose |
|---------|---------|---------|
| `allowWrite` | `[]` (nothing) | Directories where writes are allowed |
| `denyWrite` | `[]` | Paths to block writes (overrides allowWrite) |
| `denyRead` | `[]` | Paths to block reads |
## Protected paths
Fence also automatically protects certain paths regardless of config:
- Shell configs: `.bashrc`, `.zshrc`, `.profile`
- Git hooks: `.git/hooks/*`
- Git config: `.gitconfig`
See [ARCHITECTURE.md](../../ARCHITECTURE.md) for the full list.

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Filesystem Sandbox Demo
This script demonstrates fence's filesystem controls:
- allowWrite: Only specific directories are writable
- denyWrite: Block writes to sensitive files
- denyRead: Block reads from sensitive paths
Run WITHOUT fence to see all operations succeed.
Run WITH fence to see unauthorized operations blocked.
"""
import os
from pathlib import Path
SCRIPT_DIR = Path(__file__).parent.resolve()
os.chdir(SCRIPT_DIR)
results = []
def log(operation, status, message):
icon = "" if status == "success" else ""
print(f"[{icon}] {operation}: {message}")
results.append({"operation": operation, "status": status, "message": message})
def try_write(filepath, content, description):
"""Attempt to write to a file."""
try:
path = Path(filepath)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text(content)
log(description, "success", f"Wrote to {filepath}")
return True
except PermissionError:
log(description, "blocked", f"Permission denied: {filepath}")
return False
except OSError as e:
log(description, "blocked", f"OS error: {e}")
return False
def try_read(filepath, description):
"""Attempt to read from a file."""
try:
path = Path(filepath)
content = path.read_text()
log(description, "success", f"Read {len(content)} bytes from {filepath}")
return True
except PermissionError:
log(description, "blocked", f"Permission denied: {filepath}")
return False
except FileNotFoundError:
log(description, "skipped", f"File not found: {filepath}")
return False
except OSError as e:
log(description, "blocked", f"OS error: {e}")
return False
def cleanup():
"""Clean up test files."""
import shutil
try:
shutil.rmtree(SCRIPT_DIR / "output", ignore_errors=True)
(SCRIPT_DIR / "unauthorized.txt").unlink(missing_ok=True)
(SCRIPT_DIR / ".env").unlink(missing_ok=True)
(SCRIPT_DIR / "secrets.key").unlink(missing_ok=True)
except Exception:
pass
def main():
print("""
╔═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ Filesystem Sandbox Demo ║
╠═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ Tests fence's filesystem controls: ║
║ - allowWrite: Only ./output/ is writable ║
║ - denyWrite: .env and *.key files are protected ║
║ - denyRead: /etc/shadow is blocked ║
╚═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
""")
cleanup()
print("--- WRITE TESTS ---\n")
# Test 1: Write to allowed directory (should succeed)
try_write(
"output/data.txt",
"This file is in the allowed output directory.\n",
"Write to ./output/ (allowed)",
)
# Test 2: Write to project root (should fail with fence)
try_write(
"unauthorized.txt",
"This should not be writable.\n",
"Write to ./ (not in allowWrite)",
)
# Test 3: Write to .env file (should fail - denyWrite)
try_write(".env", "SECRET_KEY=stolen\n", "Write to .env (in denyWrite)")
# Test 4: Write to .key file (should fail - denyWrite pattern)
try_write(
"secrets.key", "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n", "Write to *.key (in denyWrite)"
)
print("\n--- READ TESTS ---\n")
# Test 5: Read from allowed file (should succeed)
try_read("demo.py", "Read ./demo.py (allowed)")
# Test 6: Read from /etc/shadow (should fail - denyRead)
try_read("/etc/shadow", "Read /etc/shadow (in denyRead)")
# Test 7: Read from /etc/passwd (should fail if in denyRead)
try_read("/etc/passwd", "Read /etc/passwd (in denyRead)")
# Summary
print("\n--- SUMMARY ---\n")
blocked = sum(1 for r in results if r["status"] == "blocked")
succeeded = sum(1 for r in results if r["status"] == "success")
skipped = sum(1 for r in results if r["status"] == "skipped")
if skipped > 0:
print(f"({skipped} test(s) skipped - file not found)")
if blocked > 0:
print(f"✅ Fence blocked {blocked} unauthorized operation(s)")
print(f"{succeeded} allowed operation(s) succeeded")
print("\nFilesystem sandbox is working!\n")
else:
print("⚠️ All operations succeeded - you are likely not running in fence")
print("Run with: fence --settings fence.json python demo.py\n")
cleanup()
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

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{
"network": {
"allowedDomains": []
},
"filesystem": {
"allowWrite": ["./output"],
"denyWrite": [".env", "*.key"],
"denyRead": ["/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd"]
}
}

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# Fence Examples
Runnable examples demonstrating `fence` capabilities.
If you're looking for copy/paste configs and "cookbook" workflows, also see:
- Config templates: [`docs/templates/`](../docs/templates/)
- Recipes for common workflows: [`docs/recipes/`](../docs/recipes/)
## Examples
| Example | What it demonstrates | How to run |
|--------|-----------------------|------------|
| **[01-dev-server](01-dev-server/README.md)** | Running a dev server in the sandbox, controlling **external domains** vs **localhost outbound** (Redis), and exposing an inbound port (`-p`) | `cd examples/01-dev-server && fence -p 3000 --settings fence-external-blocked.json npm start` |
| **[02-filesystem](02-filesystem/README.md)** | Filesystem controls: `allowWrite`, `denyWrite`, `denyRead` | `cd examples/02-filesystem && fence --settings fence.json python demo.py` |