Commit Graph

11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
5affaf77a5 feat: deny-by-default filesystem isolation
Flip the sandbox from allow-by-default reads (--ro-bind / /) to
deny-by-default (--tmpfs / with selective mounts). This makes the
sandbox safer by default — only system paths, CWD, and explicitly
allowed paths are accessible.

- Config: DefaultDenyRead is now *bool (nil = true, deny-by-default)
  with IsDefaultDenyRead() helper; opt out via "defaultDenyRead": false
- Linux: new buildDenyByDefaultMounts() using --tmpfs / + selective
  --ro-bind for system paths, --symlink for merged-usr distros (Arch),
  --bind for CWD, and --ro-bind for user tooling/shell configs/caches
- macOS: generateReadRules() adds CWD subpath, ancestor traversal,
  home shell configs/caches; generateWriteRules() auto-allows CWD
- Landlock: deny-by-default mode allows only specific user tooling
  paths instead of blanket home directory read access
- Sensitive .env files masked within CWD via empty-file overlay on
  Linux and deny rules on macOS
- Learning templates now include allowRead and .env deny patterns
2026-02-12 20:15:40 -06:00
da3a2ac3a4 rename Fence to Greywall as GreyHaven sandboxing component
Rebrand the project from Fence to Greywall, the sandboxing layer of the
GreyHaven platform. This updates:

- Go module path to gitea.app.monadical.io/monadical/greywall
- Binary name, CLI help text, and all usage examples
- Config paths (~/.config/greywall/greywall.json), env vars (GREYWALL_*)
- Log prefixes ([greywall:*]), temp file prefixes (greywall-*)
- All documentation, scripts, CI workflows, and example files
- README rewritten with GreyHaven branding and Fence attribution

Directory/file renames: cmd/fence → cmd/greywall, pkg/fence → pkg/greywall,
docs/why-fence.md → docs/why-greywall.md, example JSON files, and banner.
2026-02-10 16:00:24 -06:00
9cb65151ee Replace built-in proxies with tun2socks transparent proxying
Remove the built-in HTTP/SOCKS5 proxy servers and domain allowlist/denylist
system. Instead, use tun2socks with a TUN device inside the network namespace
to transparently route all TCP/UDP traffic through an external SOCKS5 proxy.

This enables truly transparent proxying where any binary (Go, static, etc.)
has its traffic routed through the proxy without needing to respect
HTTP_PROXY/ALL_PROXY environment variables. The external proxy handles its
own filtering.

Key changes:
- NetworkConfig: remove AllowedDomains/DeniedDomains/proxy ports, add ProxyURL
- Delete internal/proxy/, internal/templates/, internal/importer/
- Embed tun2socks binary (downloaded at build time via Makefile)
- Replace LinuxBridge with ProxyBridge (single Unix socket to external proxy)
- Inner script sets up TUN device + tun2socks inside network namespace
- Falls back to env-var proxying when TUN is unavailable
- macOS: best-effort env-var proxying to external SOCKS5 proxy
- CLI: remove --template/import, add --proxy flag
- Feature detection: add ip/tun/tun2socks status to --linux-features
2026-02-09 20:41:12 -06:00
JY Tan
7679fecf06 feat: add defaultDenyRead mode for strict filesystem isolation (#24) 2026-02-01 15:11:40 -08:00
JY Tan
20b7718ce8 fix: handle macOS /tmp symlink in sandbox allowWrite paths (#23) 2026-01-26 14:30:54 -08:00
JY Tan
90cd0a0a4b Add code-relaxed template, handle wildcard network allow 2025-12-29 01:39:41 -08:00
JY Tan
d8e55d9515 Introduce built-in templates for enhanced configuration options, support JSONC format 2025-12-28 22:16:50 -08:00
JY Tan
08ed28f88f Enhance Linux sandbox security features with Landlock, seccomp, and eBPF monitoring 2025-12-25 17:33:55 -08:00
JY Tan
b98b640f5a Add support for local outbound connections in sandbox configuration 2025-12-22 15:55:01 -08:00
JY Tan
14a737a36b Lint project 2025-12-18 17:02:09 -08:00
JY Tan
c02c91f051 Initial commit 2025-12-18 13:14:41 -08:00