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greywall/internal/sandbox/command.go
Mathieu Virbel da3a2ac3a4 rename Fence to Greywall as GreyHaven sandboxing component
Rebrand the project from Fence to Greywall, the sandboxing layer of the
GreyHaven platform. This updates:

- Go module path to gitea.app.monadical.io/monadical/greywall
- Binary name, CLI help text, and all usage examples
- Config paths (~/.config/greywall/greywall.json), env vars (GREYWALL_*)
- Log prefixes ([greywall:*]), temp file prefixes (greywall-*)
- All documentation, scripts, CI workflows, and example files
- README rewritten with GreyHaven branding and Fence attribution

Directory/file renames: cmd/fence → cmd/greywall, pkg/fence → pkg/greywall,
docs/why-fence.md → docs/why-greywall.md, example JSON files, and banner.
2026-02-10 16:00:24 -06:00

525 lines
13 KiB
Go

package sandbox
import (
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"gitea.app.monadical.io/monadical/greywall/internal/config"
)
// CommandBlockedError is returned when a command is blocked by policy.
type CommandBlockedError struct {
Command string
BlockedPrefix string
IsDefault bool
}
func (e *CommandBlockedError) Error() string {
if e.IsDefault {
return fmt.Sprintf("command blocked by default sandbox command policy: %q matches %q", e.Command, e.BlockedPrefix)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("command blocked by sandbox command policy: %q matches %q", e.Command, e.BlockedPrefix)
}
// CheckCommand checks if a command is allowed by the configuration.
// It parses shell command strings and checks each sub-command in pipelines/chains.
// Returns nil if allowed, or CommandBlockedError if blocked.
func CheckCommand(command string, cfg *config.Config) error {
if cfg == nil {
cfg = config.Default()
}
subCommands := parseShellCommand(command)
for _, subCmd := range subCommands {
if err := checkSingleCommand(subCmd, cfg); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// checkSingleCommand checks a single command (not a chain) against the policy.
func checkSingleCommand(command string, cfg *config.Config) error {
command = strings.TrimSpace(command)
if command == "" {
return nil
}
// Normalize the command for matching
normalized := normalizeCommand(command)
// Check if explicitly allowed (takes precedence over deny)
for _, allow := range cfg.Command.Allow {
if matchesPrefix(normalized, allow) {
return nil
}
}
// Check user-defined deny list
for _, deny := range cfg.Command.Deny {
if matchesPrefix(normalized, deny) {
return &CommandBlockedError{
Command: command,
BlockedPrefix: deny,
IsDefault: false,
}
}
}
// Check default deny list (if enabled)
if cfg.Command.UseDefaultDeniedCommands() {
for _, deny := range config.DefaultDeniedCommands {
if matchesPrefix(normalized, deny) {
return &CommandBlockedError{
Command: command,
BlockedPrefix: deny,
IsDefault: true,
}
}
}
}
// Check SSH-specific policies if this is an SSH command
if err := CheckSSHCommand(command, cfg); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// parseShellCommand splits a shell command string into individual commands.
// Handles: pipes (|), logical operators (&&, ||), semicolons (;), and subshells.
func parseShellCommand(command string) []string {
var commands []string
var current strings.Builder
var inSingleQuote, inDoubleQuote bool
var parenDepth int
runes := []rune(command)
for i := 0; i < len(runes); i++ {
c := runes[i]
// Handle quotes
if c == '\'' && !inDoubleQuote {
inSingleQuote = !inSingleQuote
current.WriteRune(c)
continue
}
if c == '"' && !inSingleQuote {
inDoubleQuote = !inDoubleQuote
current.WriteRune(c)
continue
}
// Skip splitting inside quotes
if inSingleQuote || inDoubleQuote {
current.WriteRune(c)
continue
}
// Handle parentheses (subshells)
if c == '(' {
parenDepth++
current.WriteRune(c)
continue
}
if c == ')' {
parenDepth--
current.WriteRune(c)
continue
}
// Skip splitting inside subshells
if parenDepth > 0 {
current.WriteRune(c)
continue
}
// Handle shell operators
switch c {
case '|':
// Check for || (or just |)
if i+1 < len(runes) && runes[i+1] == '|' {
// ||
if s := strings.TrimSpace(current.String()); s != "" {
commands = append(commands, s)
}
current.Reset()
i++ // Skip second |
} else {
// Just a pipe
if s := strings.TrimSpace(current.String()); s != "" {
commands = append(commands, s)
}
current.Reset()
}
case '&':
// Check for &&
if i+1 < len(runes) && runes[i+1] == '&' {
if s := strings.TrimSpace(current.String()); s != "" {
commands = append(commands, s)
}
current.Reset()
i++ // Skip second &
} else {
// Background operator - keep in current command
current.WriteRune(c)
}
case ';':
if s := strings.TrimSpace(current.String()); s != "" {
commands = append(commands, s)
}
current.Reset()
default:
current.WriteRune(c)
}
}
// Add remaining command
if s := strings.TrimSpace(current.String()); s != "" {
commands = append(commands, s)
}
// Handle nested shell invocations like "bash -c 'git push'"
var expanded []string
for _, cmd := range commands {
expanded = append(expanded, expandShellInvocation(cmd)...)
}
return expanded
}
// expandShellInvocation detects patterns like "bash -c 'cmd'" or "sh -c 'cmd'"
// and extracts the inner command for checking.
func expandShellInvocation(command string) []string {
command = strings.TrimSpace(command)
if command == "" {
return nil
}
tokens := tokenizeCommand(command)
if len(tokens) < 3 {
return []string{command}
}
// Check for shell -c pattern
shell := filepath.Base(tokens[0])
isShell := shell == "sh" || shell == "bash" || shell == "zsh" ||
shell == "ksh" || shell == "dash" || shell == "fish"
if !isShell {
return []string{command}
}
// Look for -c flag (could be combined with other flags like -lc, -ic, etc.)
for i := 1; i < len(tokens)-1; i++ {
flag := tokens[i]
// Check for -c, -lc, -ic, -ilc, etc. (any flag containing 'c')
if strings.HasPrefix(flag, "-") && strings.Contains(flag, "c") {
// Next token is the command string
innerCmd := tokens[i+1]
// Recursively parse the inner command
innerCommands := parseShellCommand(innerCmd)
// Return both the outer command and inner commands
// (we check both for safety)
result := []string{command}
result = append(result, innerCommands...)
return result
}
}
return []string{command}
}
// tokenizeCommand splits a command string into tokens, respecting quotes.
func tokenizeCommand(command string) []string {
var tokens []string
var current strings.Builder
var inSingleQuote, inDoubleQuote bool
for _, c := range command {
switch {
case c == '\'' && !inDoubleQuote:
inSingleQuote = !inSingleQuote
case c == '"' && !inSingleQuote:
inDoubleQuote = !inDoubleQuote
case (c == ' ' || c == '\t') && !inSingleQuote && !inDoubleQuote:
if current.Len() > 0 {
tokens = append(tokens, current.String())
current.Reset()
}
default:
current.WriteRune(c)
}
}
if current.Len() > 0 {
tokens = append(tokens, current.String())
}
return tokens
}
// normalizeCommand normalizes a command for matching.
// - Strips leading path from the command (e.g., /usr/bin/git -> git)
// - Collapses multiple spaces
func normalizeCommand(command string) string {
command = strings.TrimSpace(command)
if command == "" {
return ""
}
tokens := tokenizeCommand(command)
if len(tokens) == 0 {
return command
}
tokens[0] = filepath.Base(tokens[0])
return strings.Join(tokens, " ")
}
// matchesPrefix checks if a command matches a blocked prefix.
// The prefix matches if the command starts with the prefix followed by
// end of string, a space, or other argument.
func matchesPrefix(command, prefix string) bool {
prefix = strings.TrimSpace(prefix)
if prefix == "" {
return false
}
prefix = normalizeCommand(prefix)
if command == prefix {
return true
}
if strings.HasPrefix(command, prefix+" ") {
return true
}
return false
}
// SSHBlockedError is returned when an SSH command is blocked by policy.
type SSHBlockedError struct {
Host string
RemoteCommand string
Reason string
}
func (e *SSHBlockedError) Error() string {
if e.RemoteCommand != "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("SSH command blocked: %s (host: %s, command: %s)", e.Reason, e.Host, e.RemoteCommand)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("SSH blocked: %s (host: %s)", e.Reason, e.Host)
}
// CheckSSHCommand checks if an SSH command is allowed by the configuration.
// Returns nil if allowed, or SSHBlockedError if blocked.
func CheckSSHCommand(command string, cfg *config.Config) error {
if cfg == nil {
cfg = config.Default()
}
// Check if SSH config is active (has any hosts configured)
// If no SSH policy is configured, allow by default
if len(cfg.SSH.AllowedHosts) == 0 && len(cfg.SSH.DeniedHosts) == 0 {
return nil
}
host, remoteCmd, isSSH := parseSSHCommand(command)
if !isSSH {
return nil
}
// Check host policy (denied then allowed)
for _, pattern := range cfg.SSH.DeniedHosts {
if config.MatchesHost(host, pattern) {
return &SSHBlockedError{
Host: host,
RemoteCommand: remoteCmd,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("host matches denied pattern %q", pattern),
}
}
}
hostAllowed := false
for _, pattern := range cfg.SSH.AllowedHosts {
if config.MatchesHost(host, pattern) {
hostAllowed = true
break
}
}
if len(cfg.SSH.AllowedHosts) > 0 && !hostAllowed {
return &SSHBlockedError{
Host: host,
RemoteCommand: remoteCmd,
Reason: "host not in allowedHosts",
}
}
// If no remote command (interactive session), allow if host is allowed
if remoteCmd == "" {
return nil
}
return checkSSHRemoteCommand(remoteCmd, cfg)
}
// checkSSHRemoteCommand checks if a remote command is allowed by SSH policy.
// It parses the remote command into subcommands (handling &&, ||, ;, |) and validates each.
func checkSSHRemoteCommand(remoteCmd string, cfg *config.Config) error {
// Parse into subcommands just like local commands to prevent bypass via chaining
// e.g., "git status && rm -rf /" should check both "git status" and "rm -rf /"
subCommands := parseShellCommand(remoteCmd)
for _, subCmd := range subCommands {
if err := checkSSHSingleCommand(subCmd, remoteCmd, cfg); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// checkSSHSingleCommand checks a single SSH remote command against policy.
func checkSSHSingleCommand(subCmd, fullRemoteCmd string, cfg *config.Config) error {
normalized := normalizeCommand(subCmd)
if normalized == "" {
return nil
}
// Check inherited global deny list first (if enabled)
// User-defined global then default deny list
if cfg.SSH.InheritDeny {
for _, deny := range cfg.Command.Deny {
if matchesPrefix(normalized, deny) {
return &SSHBlockedError{
RemoteCommand: fullRemoteCmd,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("command %q matches inherited global deny %q", subCmd, deny),
}
}
}
if cfg.Command.UseDefaultDeniedCommands() {
for _, deny := range config.DefaultDeniedCommands {
if matchesPrefix(normalized, deny) {
return &SSHBlockedError{
RemoteCommand: fullRemoteCmd,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("command %q matches inherited default deny %q", subCmd, deny),
}
}
}
}
}
// Check SSH-specific denied commands
for _, deny := range cfg.SSH.DeniedCommands {
if matchesPrefix(normalized, deny) {
return &SSHBlockedError{
RemoteCommand: fullRemoteCmd,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("command %q matches ssh.deniedCommands %q", subCmd, deny),
}
}
}
// If allowAllCommands is true, we're in denylist mode - allow anything not denied
if cfg.SSH.AllowAllCommands {
return nil
}
// Allowlist mode: check if command is in allowedCommands
if len(cfg.SSH.AllowedCommands) > 0 {
for _, allow := range cfg.SSH.AllowedCommands {
if matchesPrefix(normalized, allow) {
return nil
}
}
// Not in allowlist
return &SSHBlockedError{
RemoteCommand: fullRemoteCmd,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("command %q not in ssh.allowedCommands", subCmd),
}
}
// No allowedCommands configured and not in denylist mode = deny all remote commands
return &SSHBlockedError{
RemoteCommand: fullRemoteCmd,
Reason: "no ssh.allowedCommands configured (allowlist mode requires explicit commands)",
}
}
// parseSSHCommand parses an SSH command and extracts the host and remote command.
// Returns (host, remoteCommand, isSSH).
func parseSSHCommand(command string) (string, string, bool) {
command = strings.TrimSpace(command)
if command == "" {
return "", "", false
}
tokens := tokenizeCommand(command)
if len(tokens) == 0 {
return "", "", false
}
cmdName := filepath.Base(tokens[0])
if cmdName != "ssh" {
return "", "", false
}
// Parse SSH arguments to find host and command
// SSH syntax: ssh [options] [user@]hostname [command]
var host string
var remoteCmd string
skipNext := false
for i := 1; i < len(tokens); i++ {
if skipNext {
skipNext = false
continue
}
arg := tokens[i]
// Skip options that take arguments
if arg == "-p" || arg == "-l" || arg == "-i" || arg == "-o" ||
arg == "-F" || arg == "-J" || arg == "-W" || arg == "-b" ||
arg == "-c" || arg == "-D" || arg == "-E" || arg == "-e" ||
arg == "-I" || arg == "-L" || arg == "-m" || arg == "-O" ||
arg == "-Q" || arg == "-R" || arg == "-S" || arg == "-w" {
skipNext = true
continue
}
// Skip single-char options (like -v, -t, -n, etc.)
if strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-") {
continue
}
// First non-option argument is the host
if host == "" {
host = arg
// Extract the hostname from user@host format
if atIdx := strings.LastIndex(host, "@"); atIdx >= 0 {
host = host[atIdx+1:]
}
continue
}
// Remaining arguments form the remote command
remoteCmd = strings.Join(tokens[i:], " ")
break
}
if host == "" {
return "", "", false
}
return host, remoteCmd, true
}