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greywall/docs/configuration.md

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# Configuration
Fence reads settings from `~/.fence.json` by default (or pass `--settings ./fence.json`). Config files support JSONC.
Example config:
```json
{
"network": {
"allowedDomains": ["github.com", "*.npmjs.org", "registry.yarnpkg.com"],
"deniedDomains": ["evil.com"]
},
"filesystem": {
"denyRead": ["/etc/passwd"],
"allowWrite": [".", "/tmp"],
"denyWrite": [".git/hooks"]
},
"command": {
"deny": ["git push", "npm publish"]
}
}
```
## Network Configuration
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `allowedDomains` | List of allowed domains. Supports wildcards like `*.example.com` |
| `deniedDomains` | List of denied domains (checked before allowed) |
| `allowUnixSockets` | List of allowed Unix socket paths (macOS) |
| `allowAllUnixSockets` | Allow all Unix sockets |
| `allowLocalBinding` | Allow binding to local ports |
| `allowLocalOutbound` | Allow outbound connections to localhost, e.g., local DBs (defaults to `allowLocalBinding` if not set) |
| `httpProxyPort` | Fixed port for HTTP proxy (default: random available port) |
| `socksProxyPort` | Fixed port for SOCKS5 proxy (default: random available port) |
### Wildcard Domain Access
Setting `allowedDomains: ["*"]` enables **relaxed network mode**:
- Direct network connections are allowed (sandbox doesn't block outbound)
- Proxy still runs for apps that respect `HTTP_PROXY`
- `deniedDomains` is only enforced for apps using the proxy
> [!WARNING]
> **Security tradeoff**: Apps that ignore `HTTP_PROXY` will bypass `deniedDomains` filtering entirely.
Use this when you need to support apps that don't respect proxy environment variables.
## Filesystem Configuration
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `denyRead` | Paths to deny reading (deny-only pattern) |
| `allowWrite` | Paths to allow writing |
| `denyWrite` | Paths to deny writing (takes precedence) |
| `allowGitConfig` | Allow writes to `.git/config` files |
## Command Configuration
Block specific commands from being executed, even within command chains.
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `deny` | List of command prefixes to block (e.g., `["git push", "rm -rf"]`) |
| `allow` | List of command prefixes to allow, overriding `deny` |
| `useDefaults` | Enable default deny list of dangerous system commands (default: `true`) |
Example:
```json
{
"command": {
"deny": ["git push", "npm publish"],
"allow": ["git push origin docs"]
}
}
```
### Default Denied Commands
When `useDefaults` is `true` (the default), fence blocks these dangerous commands:
- System control: `shutdown`, `reboot`, `halt`, `poweroff`, `init 0/6`
- Kernel manipulation: `insmod`, `rmmod`, `modprobe`, `kexec`
- Disk operations: `mkfs*`, `fdisk`, `parted`, `dd if=`
- Container escape: `docker run -v /:/`, `docker run --privileged`
- Namespace escape: `chroot`, `unshare`, `nsenter`
To disable defaults: `"useDefaults": false`
### Command Detection
Fence detects blocked commands in:
- Direct commands: `git push origin main`
- Command chains: `ls && git push` or `ls; git push`
- Pipelines: `echo test | git push`
- Shell invocations: `bash -c "git push"` or `sh -lc "ls && git push"`
## Other Options
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `allowPty` | Allow pseudo-terminal (PTY) allocation in the sandbox (for MacOS) |
## See Also
- Config templates: [`docs/templates/`](docs/templates/)
- Workflow guides: [`docs/recipes/`](docs/recipes/)